On his view, a person – a moral agent – Y at t2 is identical to a person X at t1 just in case Y’s consciousness “can be extended backwards” to X (Ibid., 39), and this is typically taken to mean that Y remembers X’s thoughts and experiences. This is what we might call a relational account of identity, for it maintains that persons at different times are identical to one another in virtue of some relation(s) between them, where such relations might be psychological or physical. Locke thus rejected what we might call a substance-based view of identity, which maintains that persons at different times are identical to one another in virtue of their consisting in one and the same substance.
Begin by prudential rationality
Today once we has Locke’s relational membership of name at hand, we are able to see just what ramifications it has for several normative affairs. This is actually the method whereby I would personally be warranted, eg, inside the wanting the latest afterlife, assuming at resurrection you will have you to definitely just who my establish awareness runs. This person might be me though he might possess a totally different body than just I’ve now (Ibid., 44). It should be irrelevant if you ask me, about this have a look at, what substance (looks otherwise spirit) I’ve found my personal awareness – me personally – connected with. If the, particularly, my personal fist was indeed stop and you can my awareness adhered to it, “that will be a similar self that has been alarmed for the entire body yesterday, due to the fact to make section of in itself, whose steps it you should never but admit as the very own today” (Ibid., 46).
It is this version of opinion – in the my ownership away from specific steps – that output a match up between name and you will ethical obligations (“accountability,” to have Locke), for 1 try justifiably held accountable only for those ideas did because of the a home so you’re able to whom a person’s introduce awareness stretches, which is, it is merely for those actions I remember carrying out that i is also justifiably be held responsible. Since Locke places it, easily in the morning penalized into methods out-of a self whoever advice and you may knowledge I do not consider, “just what improvement is there anywhere between one to discipline, being created unhappy?” (Ibid., 51) Therefore, on the day off View, “This new phrase are warranted of the consciousness all the individuals will possess, that they by themselves, as to what authorities soever they appear, or what compounds soever one to awareness abides by, are identical one the full time those things, and you may have earned one to punishment for them” (Ibid.).
The key to possess Locke is the fact what foundation both prudential question and you will ethical obligations ‘s the individual label relatives, a relation distinctively unifying temporally distinct people-levels via consciousness. Therefore was due to the fact Locke valued apart private title away from physical title, and every other types of compound-created label, one to after philosophers eg Joseph Butler and you can Thomas Reid objected so you’re able to they. Thus, particularly, Butler accuses Locke out-of a “great mistake,” that is which he don’t recognize that the fresh new relatives out-of understanding presupposes label, which means never make up they (Butler 1736, 100). Put another way, I am able to think about just my personal event, but it’s not my personal memory regarding an experience that makes it exploit; instead, I remember they only because it’s already mine. Very while memories is inform you my personal term which includes earlier experiencer, it doesn’t build you to definitely experiencer me personally. The thing i have always been remembering, insists Butler, will be feel away from a compound, particularly, an identical compound one to constitutes me now.